The Right of Self-Determination:
Is East Timor a Viable Model for Kashmir? by Singh, Amardeep
9
International bodies and legal scholars have universallyaccepted the idea that the realization of the group right toself-determination is a prerequisite for the effective enjoy-
ment of individual rights. In its General Comment 12, the UN
Human Rights Committee (HRC) states that “[t]he right of self-
determination is of particular importance because its realization
is an essential condition for the effective guarantee and obser-
vance of individual human rights and for the promotion and
strengthening of those rights. It is for that reason that States . . .
placed this provision as [A]rticle 1 [of the International
Covenant for Civil and Political Rights] apart from and before
all of the other rights. . . .” This principle is illustrated by the
situation in Kashmir, where massive violations of individual
rights are being committed daily in the context of a larger
struggle over group rights and state boundaries. Nevertheless,
unlike 50 years ago, when the universal human rights system was
in its infancy, today the development
of the right to self-determination
points to a legally tenable solution.
As exemplified by East Timor, this
solution requires that the people of
Kashmir be allowed to freely exercise
their right to self-determination
through an impartial plebiscite and
that the international community
serve as a guarantor of this right in
the event the States involved do not
allow for its realization.
The Expanding Scope of the Right to Self-Determination in
International Law
The right to self-determination of peoples is enshrined in the
first article of the Charter of the United Nations, the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICE-
SCR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR). Article 1.1 of both the ICCPR and ICESCR
states, “[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determination. By
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”
According to the Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of
Racial Discrimination, the right to self-determination is “a fun-
damental principle of international law.” This fundamental
principle has slowly expanded from being a right exclusively
belonging to colonized peoples to include all peoples who are
systematically denied human rights.
Despite being enshrined in the first article of numerous
human rights instruments, the right to self-determination is nev-
ertheless relatively underdeveloped. This is in part because the
HRC declared it has no competence to receive complaints
asserting a violation of the right to self-determination because
the right is a group right rather than an individual right. Indi-
vidual rights, according to the HRC, are set out in articles 6
through 27 of the ICCPR. Modern commentary on the right to
self-determination has thus been left to UN treaty bodies’ com-
ments on State reports, general comments, or recommendations,
and resolutions of the UN General Assembly, which, according
to Article 13(1)(a) of the UN Charter, is charged with “encour-
aging the progressive development of international law and its
codification.” The result is a relatively undefined scope of the
right to self-determination. 
The seminal issue in defining the right has been establish-
ing to which peoples the right to self-determination belongs. The
first significant comments on this issue, and on the right of self-
determination in general, appeared in Resolutions 1514 and
1541 of the General Assembly. In those resolutions, the General
Assembly made clear that the right to self-determination belongs
to peoples under colonial domination who are struggling for
independence. General Assembly Resolution 1514—the 1960
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples—relates the right to self-determination
only to “the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domi-
nation and exploitation” and of those in “Trust and Non-Self-
Governing Territories.” 
Neither of the resolutions addresses whether the right applies
to peoples in non-colonial States. Additionally, Resolution 1514
seemingly closes the door on any unilateral right of secession
by stating that “[a]ny attempt aimed
at the partial or total disruption of
the national unity and the territor-
ial integrity of a country is incom-
patible with the purposes and prin-
ciples of the Charter of the United
Nations.” Resolution 1514, there-
fore, applies the right of self-deter-
mination only to colonized peoples
and forbids unilateral secession by
stating that the right does not
include an effort to disrupt the ter-
ritorial integrity of a country.
The General Assembly revisited the issue of unilateral seces-
sion in 1970 when it passed Resolution 2625, the “Declaration
on Principles of Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.”
For the first time, a qualifying principle was applied to the
notion of absolute territorial integrity. Resolution 1514 forbids
any action that “would dismember or impair, totally or in part,
the territorial integrity . . .” of a State. Resolution 2625 states that
the Resolution 1514 prohibition applies only to those countries
“conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples . . . and thus pos-
sessed of a government representing the whole people belong-
ing to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or
colour.” Thus, if a State did not conduct itself in compliance with
the principles of “equal rights and self-determination of peoples,”
its territorial integrity could be questioned.
Recently, commentators and courts have taken this qualifi-
cation on territorial integrity to mean that the right of self-
determination applies not only to colonized peoples, but also
to peoples who suffer massive and systematic human rights vio-
lations, or have no means of representation or redress within
their government. For instance, in a 1998 Reference Opinion
on the secession of Quebec from Canada, the Supreme Court
of Canada stated that “an oppressed people” who suffer “mas-
sive violation of its fundamental rights” may have a right to form
a sovereign State. Also, in a Concurring Opinion in a case tan-
gentially related to the issue of self-determination, Judge Wild-
haber of the European Court of Human Rights noted, “[u]ntil
recently in international practice the right to self-determination
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was . . . restricted to, a right to decolonisation. In recent years
a consensus has seemed to emerge that peoples may also
exercise a right to self-determination if their human rights are
consistently and flagrantly violated or if they are without rep-
resentation at all . . . .” Thus, self-determination has developed
over the years from being a right of peoples under colonial sub-
jugation to a right of peoples who are subjected to massive
human rights violations or who are without representation
within their State.
Implementing the Right of Self-Determination—The Inevitabil-
ity of the Referendum in East Timor
A question arises as to how the right to self-determination may
be realized or implemented. Although no specific method for
realizing self-determination is mandated, principles of inter-
national law dictate that whatever means are utilized, they must
reflect the free will of the people. Nonetheless, as modern
international practice has developed, it seems the preferred
method for exercising the right of self-determination, espe-
cially in cases where state boundaries may change, is the refer-
endum or plebiscite.
For example, in the case of the Western Sahara, Morocco
agreed in 1998 to a referendum organized by the UN in coop-
eration with the Organization on African Unity, whereby the peo-
ple of the Western Sahara could determine whether to remain
part of Morocco. Similarly, the Sudanese government has agreed
to a referendum for the people of southern Sudan, thus enabling
them to choose either unity or secession. In Puerto Rico, the
United States government held a non-binding plebiscite giving
its citizens a choice between maintaining commonwealth status,
becoming a state of the United States, or creating a sovereign
State. In Quebec, the state government chose to conduct a ref-
erendum on whether the people of Quebec wanted to remain
a part of Canada. Finally, the government of France has agreed
to hold a referendum in New Caledonia on whether it will
remain a part of France or become independent. Other exam-
ples abound. 
East Timor’s Effect on the Development of the Law of Self-
Determination
UN action in East Timor created and solidified new devel-
opments in the international law of self-determination in two
ways. First, by seeking to implement the right of self-determi-
nation by allowing the possibility of creating a new State from
a territory with uncertain legal status, the UN for the first time
affirmed the right to secede in a territory that was neither
clearly a colony nor a non-self-governing territory. Second, by
determining efforts to disrupt the results of the ballot were a
“threat to peace,” the UN seems to have defined an attempt to
negate the exercise of self-determination as a subject of inter-
national concern justifying international intervention.  
In 1960, when the General Assembly put East Timor on its
list of non-self-governing territories, East Timor was a Portuguese
colony. Portugal therefore rejected the view that East Timor was
a non-self-governing territory. According to Article 73 of the UN
Charter, a non-self-governing territory is an area “whose peoples
have not yet attained a full measure of self-government.” In 1974,
Portugal finally succumbed to international pressure and
accepted East Timor’s status as a non-self-governing territory.
In December 1975, Indonesia invaded and occupied East Timor,
claiming sovereignty over it. East Timor’s international status
thus remained in question for over 25 years.   
The end of Indonesian President Suharto’s dictatorial reign
in 1998, and the resulting instability in Indonesia, instigated
rapid progress in the negotiations on East Timor’s final status.
On May 5, 1999, Indonesia and Portugal signed an agree-
ment—Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and the
Portugese Republic on the Question of East Timor (May 5
Agreement)—to allow the UN to organize a “popular consul-
tation” of the East Timorese people through a “direct, secret and
universal ballot.” The purpose of the ballot was to determine
whether the people of East Timor wished to be part of an
autonomous unit of Indonesia. If the East Timorese rejected this
autonomous framework, the May 5 Agreement called for the
Government of Indonesia to “terminate its links with East
Timor” and for a “peaceful and orderly transfer of authority in
East Timor to the United Nations,” which would eventually
lead to independence.
The popular consultation, organized and conducted by the
UN, was held on August 30, 1999. Ninety-eight percent of the
East Timorese people voted to reject autonomous status in
Indonesia. Angered by the agreement to allow the popular
consultation, and the eventual results of the vote, pro-Indone-
sia militias engaged in mass violence in East Timor before and
after the ballot, including murders, massacres, disappearances,
forced expulsion, rape, sexual harassment of women, and
destruction of property. In response, the UN Security Council
authorized the creation of the International Force for East
Timor (INTERFET) to restore peace in East Timor and to pro-
tect the results of the popular consultation.
As discussed above, the status of East Timor was never clear
until the popular consultation. UN General Assembly Resolu-
tions up until 1982 classified it as a non-self-governing territory.
The UN nevertheless negotiated the May 5 Agreement, and
other agreements, with Indonesia as if Indonesia exercised
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some sovereignty over East Timor. Further, the May 5 Agreement
carefully avoided any reference to the legal status of East Timor.
Despite this unclear legal status, and despite the lack of any
precedent supporting the right to independence in territories
that were neither colonized nor non-self-governing, the UN
chose to support the right of the people of East Timor to form
a new State.
In addition, by authorizing INTERFET to restore peace in
East Timor after the ballot, the UN seems to have authorized
force to protect the right to self-determination. Chapter VII of
the UN Charter authorizes the use of force where a “threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” has
occurred. By referring to Chapter VII in its resolution autho-
rizing the creation of INTERFET, the Security Council has
endorsed the notion that a threat to the freely expressed will of
the people in East Timor may allow international intervention,
with the use of force if necessary.
Modern Developments in the Law of Self-Determination as
They Apply to Kashmir
Modern developments in the international law of self-deter-
mination, especially in East Timor, allow for three principal argu-
ments to be made in support of international enforcement of
the right to self-determination in Kashmir. First, as with East
Timor, Kashmir’s international legal status is uncertain. It is not
clear whether Kashmir is a part of India, Pakistan, both, or an
independent territory. Like in East Timor, this uncertain status
should not be an impediment to the implementation of the right
to self-determination. Second, as in East Timor, the Security
Council has determined the people of Kashmir should exercise
their right to self-determination through an impartial plebiscite.
Threats to peace in Kashmir, however, have hindered the real-
ization of this right. Nevertheless, as with East Timor, these
threats to peace should not be a legal impediment to Security
Council action in defense of the right to self-determination.
Finally, even if the above arguments are not sufficient legal
justification for international action in support of the right to
self-determination in Kashmir, the emerging principles that
massive, systematic human rights violations or a lack of repre-
sentation within an existing State create a right to secession,
clearly support calls for international action in Kashmir.
Pakistan and India became independent States on August 15,
1947. Under the partition plan, all Muslim majority areas were
to go to Pakistan and all other areas were to go to India. The
Maharaja of Kashmir, a Kashmiri Hindu, acceded Kashmir to
India on October 26, 1947, purportedly against the wishes of the
people of Kashmir, who were 77 percent Muslim. Pakistan
immediately disputed India’s claim to Kashmir. In 1948, India
brought this issue to the Security Council. On April 21, 1948,
the Security Council, “[n]oting with satisfaction that both India
and Pakistan desire that the question of accession of Jammu and
Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through the
democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite,” called on
India and Pakistan to “create proper conditions for a free and
impartial plebiscite.”
In July 1949, India and Pakistan signed the Karachi Agree-
ment establishing a cease-fire line to be supervised by UN
observers. On March 30, 1951, pursuant to the Karachi Agree-
ment, the Security Council decided that the UN Military
Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) should
supervise the cease-fire in Kashmir. The parties, however, were
not able to agree on conditions for a plebiscite. The Security
Council subsequently called for a plebiscite in Kashmir in 1951
and again in 1957. The parties, again, were not able to create
conditions conducive to conducting a plebiscite. At the end of
1971, India and Pakistan again fought over Kashmir. In July 1972,
India and Pakistan signed an agreement defining a Line of
Control in Kashmir, which has approximately one-third of
Kashmir under Pakistan’s control and two-thirds under India’s
control. At present, UNMOGIP still supervises the cease-fire.  
In 1990, clashes erupted en masse between the Kashmiri peo-
ple and government forces in India’s portion of Kashmir.
According to government sources, at least 34,000 civilians have
died as a result of the violence. The 2000 U.S. State Department
Country Report on Human Rights Practices for India states
that “[e]xtrajudicial killings, including faked encounter killings
[whereby police falsely claim to have encountered a militant],
deaths of suspects in police custody throughout the country, and
excessive use of force by security forces combating active insur-
gencies,” and “torture and rape by police and other agents of
the Government” are prevalent throughout India-held Kashmir.
In its 2000 Annual Report, Amnesty International states that in
Kashmir, India’s Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act “gives the
security forces powers to shoot to kill and grants them virtual
immunity from prosecution.” In addition to suffering from
government abuses, citizens in Kashmir also suffer from abuses
by insurgents. The State Department Report states that in
Kashmir “[t]he concerted campaign of execution-style killings
of civilians by Kashmiri militant groups . . . continued, and
included several killings of political leaders and party workers.
Separatist militants were responsible for numerous, serious
abuses, including killing of armed forces personnel, police,
government officials, and civilians; torture; rape; and brutality.”
A general condition of lawlessness and mass human rights vio-
lations presently exists in Indian-held Kashmir.
The conditions in Kashmir, especially as seen in light of
developments in East Timor, meet modern legal requirements
for international intervention on behalf of the Kashmiri people
so that they may exercise their right of self-determination. First,
the uncertainty of Kashmir’s international legal status is not a
legal bar to intervention. It is not clear whether Kashmir is
colonized by India and/or Pakistan, is a non-self-governing
territory, or is some other legal entity. East Timor’s ambiguous
status, however, did not act as an impediment to the imple-
mentation of the right to self-determination. Rather, Kashmir’s
uncertain status, and the 52 years of bloodshed and human rights
violations resulting from that uncertainty, calls for interna-
tional intervention in order to serve the interests of stability and
peace, which are enshrined in the UN Charter.
Second, as mentioned above, threats to peace in Kashmir, like
in East Timor, present an obstacle to conducting an impartial
plebiscite. In East Timor, the Security Council, pursuant to its
powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorized
INTERFET to preserve the freely expressed will of the people.
The legal authority to use force, if necessary, to implement the
right to self-determination is stronger in Kashmir because
threats to international peace are arguably greater in Kashmir
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crime against humanity. After reviewing the treatment of
enslavement in domestic laws, conventions, and customary inter-
national law, the Trial Chamber determined that at the time rel-
evant to the indictment, the crime of enslavement in customary
international law consisted of “the exercise of any or all of the pow-
ers attaching to the right of ownership over a person.” The mens
rea is satisfied if such powers are exercised intentionally.
In determining whether enslavement has been established,
the Trial Chamber cited a variety of
indicators that could be considered,
such as control, lack of consent,
exploitation, compulsory labor, and
the accruing of some gain to the
perpetrator. “Sex” and “control of
sexuality” were two of the many
other factors cited as possible indi-
cators of enslavement. The Trial
Chamber opined that “[d]etaining or keeping someone in cap-
tivity, without more, would, depending on the circumstances of
a case, usually not constitute enslavement.” 
Cumulative convictions
This issue concerns whether an accused can be found guilty
of more than one offense for the same conduct. The Trial
Chamber cited the Appeals Chamber Judgement in the
v
Celebići
case, which allowed cumulative convictions for the same conduct
provided there are different statutory provisions that have a
“materially distinct element not contained in the other,” such
that one “requires proof of a fact not required by the other.”
Applying this approach to the case at hand, the Trial Chamber
found that Article 3 and Article 5 of the Statute have at least one
“materially distinct element that does not appear in the other.”
It noted that convictions for torture and rape for the same
conduct are also permissible as they too have materially distinct
elements. 
Verdicts and Sentences
Kunarac was acquitted of responsibility as a superior for
crimes committed by persons under his authority because the
Trial Chamber concluded that it was not sufficiently proven that
“the soldiers who committed the offences in the Indictment were
under the effective control of Kunarac at the time they com-
mitted the offences.” All convictions were based solely on indi-
vidual criminal responsibility, crimes that the accused either com-
mitted physically or were otherwise responsible for facilitating.
Each was acquitted of some charges, usually based on failure of
the prosecution to prove the crime
or the accused’s responsibility for it
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Kunarac was found guilty on 11
counts: three counts of rape as a
crime against humanity, four counts
of rape as a violation of the laws or
customs of war, one count of enslave-
ment as a crime against humanity,
one count of torture as a crime against humanity, and two
counts of torture as a violation of the laws or customs of war. He
received a single sentence of 28 years imprisonment.
Kova vc was found guilty on four counts: one count each for
rape as a crime against humanity and a violation of the laws or
customs of war, enslavement as a crime against humanity, and
outrages upon personal dignity as a violation of the laws or cus-
toms of war. He was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment.
Vukovíc was found guilty on four counts: one count each for
rape and torture as crimes against humanity and rape and tor-
ture as violations of the laws or customs of war. He received a
sentence of 12 years imprisonment. 
*Kelly D. Askin is the acting executive director of the War Crimes
Research Office at the Washington College of Law. 
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than they were in East Timor. India and Pakistan have fought
three wars over Kashmir. Both possess, and have tested, nuclear
weapons and over 34,000 people have died in Kashmir in the
past ten years. Therefore, UN intervention in support of the right
to self-determination is justified in Kashmir through the exam-
ple of East Timor.
Finally, even if these arguments are not sufficient legal jus-
tification, the principles now recognized in international law—
that massive, systematic human rights violations or a lack of rep-
resentation within an existing State create a right to
secession—support calls for international action in Kashmir. As
outlined above, all human rights bodies unequivocally agree that
human rights are massively and systematically denied in Indian-
held Kashmir and that the Kashmiri people have no recourse
within the Indian union for exercising their right of self-
determination. 
Conclusion
The modern development of the right to self-determina-
tion, especially in East Timor, requires the people of Kashmir
be allowed to exercise their right to self-determination. Secu-
rity Council resolutions addressing the scope of the right to self-
determination, in combination with State practice, indicate
the right should be implemented through an impartial plebiscite,
thereby enabling the Kashmiri people to freely determine their
future. Finally, following East Timor’s example, if the parties do
not cooperate in creating conditions allowing the Kashmiri
people to enjoy the right to self-determination, the threat to
international peace caused by the mass violations of human
rights in Kashmir provides clear legal justification for interna-
tional intervention to implement the right. Indeed, until the
group right to self-determination, which the Human Rights
Commission states is essential to the effective guarantee of indi-
vidual rights, is realized in Kashmir, it is likely the mass viola-
tions of individual rights will continue. 
*Amardeep Singh is an LL.M. candidate at the Washington College
of Law and associate editor for the Human Rights Brief.
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